

**The “Nationalization of EU politics” versus the “Europeanization of national politics”**

**A comparative analysis of Germany, Italy and Spain**

## 1. Introduction

Within the academic literature on Europeanization, or the domestic adaptation to European regional integration, the consensus has emerged that Europe matters (van der Eijk and Frankli, 2007). Many authors talk about the Europeanization of party politics (Külahci, 2012) and the increasing importance of European issue voting (Hobolt and Spoon, 2012). The basic point of departure is that the increasing powers and influence at different policy levels adopted by European institutions have gradually increased the importance of the European presence in national politics (Evans, 1998 and 2002; Ferrara and Weishaupt, 2004; Tillman, 2004 and 2012; Carruba and Timpote, 2005; Marsh, 2007; Hix and Marsh, 2007 and 2011; de Vries, 2007; Hobolt et al., 2008; Clark and Rohrschneider, 2009).

Previous literature has generally considered that this Europeanization of party systems is conditional upon country specific variables (institutions, configuration of public opinion and the presence of a Eurosceptic party) or non-country specific variables (structure of cleavages, dimensionality of ideological conflict, political parties strategic responses, electoral system and more) (Külahci, 2012, pp. 171–172). However, it is still unclear to what extent and in which ways Europe matters (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003). Previous studies normally forget the heterogeneous dynamics and consequences of the integration in many European countries (Gabel, 2000). That is, European integration (and therefore the process of Europeanization) is not homogeneous across European states. Countries' influence in the EU differs substantially. In short, a country's influence in the EU resulting from the European integration and its consequences interacts with citizens' perceptions and behavior. This process has become even more conspicuous with the consequences and performance of the EU during the current economic and fiscal crises.

Following this idea, we introduce a new approach to the discussion on the Europeanization of party politics. We argue in this paper that as consequence of the current crisis there is an increasing dual perception of how the European Union is acting or should be acting that has affected individual's electoral behavior and consequently the structure of party systems. Our main

contention is that in states that play a pivotal role in the European institutions, such as Germany, citizens perceive (at least marginally) that their vote could have some impact on European policies, i.e. the current European status quo. In other words, some decisions adopted at the national level (for instance, by the German government) are likely to have repercussions at the European level. Accordingly, parties at the national level compete over different policies and alternatives distributed on an ideological continuum. In these contexts, citizens have internalized the influence of their government in European affairs and consequently citizens display 'positional issues' on the European issues, generating a 'nationalization of EU politics'.

In contrast, Southern European countries seem to have cabinets with little influence on European's decisions, especially those under the supervision of the *troika* (European Commission, Central European Bank, and the International Monetary Fund). Having a less influential role and less policy leverage has resulted in a different debate at the national level over EU politics than in continental Europe. The non-pivotal role played by Southern states has incentivized the feeling among their citizens that their government is a mere observer of EU policies, with little bargaining power. Even national decisions over public policies are considered to be subject to EU preferences (the clearest example is the cap imposed by the *troika* on public debt). As a consequence, there has been an Europeanization of national politics, which means that the political debate still primarily revolves around the national government's performance at the European level and how the government was able to represent national interests at the EU level. The dispute in these cases is not so much about the EU policies, especially among those main parties which do not dispute EU membership, but rather becomes a 'valence issue'.

When it comes to issue voting, this argument implies that in pivotal countries voters' decisions follow a spatial directional logic (there are positional issues about the EU), whereby citizens chose the party in order to move the European status quo to their preferred direction ('directional EU issue voting'). Conversely, in non-pivotal countries, voters' decisions are based on valence

considerations, that is, on the assessment of national government performance at the EU level ('sanctioning EU issue voting').

We test these claims studying three cases that have experienced different dynamics regarding the Europeanization of party politics. More concretely, hypotheses are put to the test in one pivotal country, Germany, and two non-pivotal ones, Italy and Spain. By employing three panel surveys, we empirically show that the directional model works better in a pivotal country, while the valence model better suits non-pivotal states. In sum, our findings show how the economic crisis that started in 2008 and its politicization in the national arena had heterogeneous effects on voters' decision process for the European Elections, not only due to country a non-country levels factors, but also to the relative pivotal position of the different countries in the EU.

## **2. Europeanization of National Party Politics**

Classical electoral studies have defined European elections as second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980, 1997; Schmitt, 2005; Marsh, 2010). At the heart of the proposition is that EP elections are of lesser importance than first-order elections for national office. This phenomenon is attributed, firstly, to the low interest expressed by citizens towards the decisions made by the EU and European issues. Second, political parties normally direct their political messages to national issues (Eijk, 2005; Hix et al., 2007). Third, mass media rarely offers a transnational perspective of issues and, when they do it, a negative image of the EU prevails (Vreese et al., 2006). Finally, elections have a transnational component as countries send different members to the EP (MEP); parties are grouped together in Europarties created after the elections and, most importantly, the EP does not normally elect (it only ratifies) the president of the European Commission<sup>1</sup> (Follesdal and Hix, 2006; Hix et al., 2007).

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<sup>1</sup>It is fair to note that in the 2014 European Parliament Elections, Europarties proposed different candidates for the European Commission presidency, publicly announcing that they will respect voter's choice (except the European Popular Party, which was more ambiguous on this respect).

However, the debate over the characteristics of the second-order elections (SOE) model has again re-emerged. The 'revisionist school' encourages the academic community to think about how we should conceptualize these elections and whether the traditional second-order approach is still valid when explaining voters' decision process. These approaches are not fundamentally putting into question the SOE model, but instead are refining and extending some of its proposed theoretical mechanisms. In short, new studies consider that Europe (and European issues) has been a "sleeping giant", which is gradually awakening and therefore modifying citizens' behavior in the EU elections (Franklin and Van Der Eijk, 2007; Green-Pedersen, 2012; Hutter, 2012).

European issues have progressively been incorporated into the national political debate (Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996 Evans, 1998 and 2002; Tillman, 2004 and 2012; Hix and Marsh, 2007 and 2011; de Vries, 2007; Clark and Rohrschneider, 2009). European issues are currently more present in national mass media and in public opinion than they used to be (Flickinger and Studlar, 2007; Adam and Maier, 2011; Boomgaarden et al., 2011). Although this process is likely to be more intense among better-informed citizens (de Vries et al., 2011), European issues are increasingly present in national party politics and, therefore, in individuals' vote choice (de Vries et al., 2011, Hobolt and Wittrock 2011; Sanders, 2012; De Sio and Franklin, 2012).

### **3. The theoretical Argument: The mediating role of European integration**

However, this Europeanization process of national politics is not homogeneous, since it depends on a lot of domestic factors as well the unique influence of the European integration (Külahci, 2012). As it has been argued before, the distinctive effect on different countries of the European integration might have consequences on national politics and voters' behavior (Gabel, 2000). The economic crisis that started in 2008 opened a new scenario that allows us to test this argument even further. As it has been recently argued, the necessity to integrate heterogeneity in our theoretical and

empirical models has increased, due to the heterogeneous impact of the economic crisis, which was particularly harsh in Southern European countries (Freire et al., 2014; Verney, 2015).

The reason is that the crisis had a differential impact in different countries (beyond the impact on voters), was by increasing the differential pivotal role of national governments. We argue that this has ultimately been integrated into voters' decision process. Indeed, over the last years, some countries have increasingly adopted a pivotal role: they play a predominant role in the decision-making process and the majority of the member states consider them (either formally or informally) as being in a higher hierarchical position. Germany's increasing influence in EU decisions is probably the paradigmatic example of this process.

In contrast, other states, such as Italy or Spain, have assumed a non-pivotal position. Citizens of these countries consider or perceive that decisions taken by their national governments are conditioned by supranational organizations or international actors, having a rather low influence and their status is assumed to be low. These differences have increased after the economic crisis creating, to our view, heterogeneous effects on voters' decision process, especially in regards to the integration of European issues into their decision schema.

If our argument is true, we should observe the following:

A) States where there is not any Europeanization of EU politics. In these countries the SOE are fully at place, and national issues are the only considered. In this case, national positional and valence issues are present in voters' decisions.

B) States with Europeanization of EU politics and a pivotal position: In these countries, citizens factor in their voting decision process the structure of power present at the European level. They know that voting for one party or another has consequences on the political, economic and social model that is implemented at the European level. This integration leads citizens to consider the European debate under a directional logic (Downs, 1957; Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989). Thus, policy preferences are structured in a traditional axis

the extremes of which encapsulate different views of the European model. Parties locate themselves on this axis and compete with each other. Under this framework, citizens will try to move the current status quo with their vote towards their preferred direction. Citizens know they can change Europe's status quo because their country holds a pivotal position at the EU level. All in all, this has produced a nationalization of EU politics: national issues will still be salient (European Elections are still of second-order), but the European issues will integrate into the voter's decision process.

C) States with a non-pivotal position: We expect the situation to be different in those countries with more limited role and limited leverage in EU policy decisions. In these contexts there is a general perception among the public that national governments have little influence in moving the current status quo, although without questioning the full integration in the EU (exit). Citizens internalize this reality. As a consequence, voters become more concerned about the consequences of the European integration, but European issues are not positional, but are rather valence issues, as least for the most relevant parties that do not present the exit option. Directional and distance models are no longer valid for explaining party choice (Stokes, 1963; Stokes 1992). In this context, the debate is structured over how national politicians and especially government authorities have been able to represent national interests at the EU level. In this sense, political competition is structured as a function of how well the national government has managed the country's interests. In short, EU issues become valence issues and are integrated as such on voters' decision process. This will result in an "EU sanctioning" voting model based on government national performance.

Table 1 summarizes our theoretical expectations. It is important to note that, while there should not be any difference concerning the standard ideological scale, we expect differences on the impact of European issues according to the country's (non-)pivotal role in the EU.

Table 1: Theoretical expectations summary

	Europeization of party politics (EU issues)	Non-Europeization of party politics (LR issues)
	Incumbent/Opposition	Incumbent/Opposition
Directional Issue Model	Europeanization of National Politics: Accountability based on European Issues (Pivotal States)	Dominance of the National Arena (SOE) No Europeanization
Valence Issue Model	Nationalization of European Politics: Accountability based on national government performance with Europe (Non Pivotal State)	Dominance of the National Arena (SOE) No Europeanization

Based on these mechanisms, we outline the different hypotheses on Table 2. We expect that the directional model based on EU issues should structure voters' decision process in pivotal countries (Germany), while the same should not be true for non-pivotal states like Spain or Italy. Again, the mechanism intends to grasp the idea that the German population may have integrated this into their decision process in that they are able to move European status quo to one direction or another. In contrast, this process is absent in Spain or Italy, countries where the electorate essentially decides their vote as a function of their assessment of the national government's performance at the EU level.

It is also critical to notice two important aspects in this discussion. National issues have not fully disappeared from the electoral elections. These issues, measured by the traditional left/right schema, are still present as an orthogonal dimension of party competition (Hooghe et. al., 2004). EU elections are still SOEs. Additionally, and based on the same SOE logic, approval of EU decisions are not relevant for all the scenarios, since, as it has been argued by this same voting model, citizens do not perceived any "direct"



individual accountability capacity for the EU decisions (this is the well-known ‘democratic deficit of the EU’).

Table 2: Hypotheses expectations (summary)

			Europeanization of party politics (EU issues)	Non-Europeanization of party politics (LR issues)
		Country	Incumbent/Opposition	Incumbent/Opposition
Directional Issue Model		Spain	No	Yes
		Italy	No	Yes
		Germany	Yes	Yes
Valence Issue Model	National Government Performance	Spain	Yes	Yes
		Italy	Yes	Yes
		Germany	No	Yes
	EU Commission Performance	Spain	No	No
		Italy	No	No
		Germany	No	No

Finally, we do not question in our argument the importance of domestic factors in the distinctive influence of the politicization of EU issues in the national arena. We still think that there are important conditional national factors such as the different political party strategies and party supply at the national level (Parsons and Weber, 2011; Silke and Maier, 2011; De Sio and Franklin, 2012). Our argument is that citizens’ pivotal perception of their respective states in the EU has an important interactive effect with other contextual factors when it comes to explain EU issue voting in EU elections.

#### 4. The data and the model

The present analysis is based on web survey panels with pre- and post-electoral studies for the 2014 European Elections with representative samples in three countries (Spain and Italy by Quotas, Germany probabilistic sample from online panel).<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The German data is part of the GESIS Panel # ZA5665. The Italian one corresponds with the Panel Itanes ESS 2014 panel. In Spain these data is part of the CIUPANEL study. All of them form part of the ESS 2014 data set.

The dependent variable is individual vote, which is a categorical variable with the preference for all the main parties of the systems. We estimate a multinomial model having as a reference category voting for the incumbent party.

For the positional issues we use the left-right scale for national issues and for the EU scale.<sup>3</sup> For the operationalization of the directional issues we use the individual distance from the status quo, according to these two scales (L-R Scale and EU scale). To measure the position of the status quo we use respondents' perception of the government location on this scale.<sup>4</sup>

For the positional issues we use respondents' evaluation of the national government's performance for national politics and those of the EU general performance for the EU issues.<sup>5</sup>

Therefore, we have four relevant independent variables for the argument: L/R Distance and EU Distance for the directional issue voting model; and Approval of National Government and Approval of EU performance for the "sanctioning" issue model.

We have also added a set of controlling variables to this model: LR scale, EU scale, EU knowledge, age, religion and education. For the sanctioning model we have also added as a controlling variable respondents' attribution of responsibilities of the current economic situation.<sup>6</sup>

All the independent variables are time-lagged variables.

Therefore we have two models EU issue voting models (control variables in italics):

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<sup>3</sup> The question is as follows: "Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far. What is your opinion? What number on this scale best describes your position?" Push further 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Gone too far (DK).

<sup>4</sup> For Germany, this question is not used, so we use as a proxy respondent's average position of the CDU/CSU in those two scales).

<sup>5</sup> National government approval is measured by the general question: "Do you approve or disapprove of the government's record to date?" EU government approval is measured by the question: "Do you approve or disapprove of the policy decisions made by the EU over the past 12 months?" Same categories are used for both questions (1 "Disapproved", 2 "Approve", and 3 "DK").

<sup>6</sup> In fact we have a battery of two questions. One for the attribution of responsibilities of the current economic situation for the national government and one for the EU. The question is "How responsible is each of the following institutions for the economic conditions in [country]?" The national government, and the European Union. We use a 0 to 10 scale where "0" is "no responsibility", and "10" is "full responsibility".

**Directional Model:**  $Voto = f(\text{Difference from status quo in EU} + \text{difference from Status quo in LR} + LRScale + EUScale + age + religion + education + EU\ knowledge)$

**Sanctioning Model:**  $Voto = f(\text{Approval of EU governance} + \text{Approval of Nat. government} + \text{Responsability of EU of crisis} + \text{Responsability of Nat. Gover of crisis} + LRScale + EUScale + age + religion + education + EU\ knowledge)$

The final model to test our hypotheses is a combination of the two preceding models. The hypotheses are tested by comparing the impact of these four variables: **difference from Status quo in EU + difference from Status quo in LR + Approval of EU governance + Approval of Nat. government**

## 5. Empirical results

Although we have estimated both models separately (see tables in the appendix), we present in Table 4 the results of one unique model that combines both the directional and sanctioning issue voting models. In this table we do not present the parameters for all variables included, but only the four relevant to the argument.

In this table, we can first observe the Spanish scenario. In this scenario, we have only a full sanctioning model in which everything is about respondents' evaluations of the national government and the national (LR/distance) directional voting model. Both parameters are in the expected direction (greater distance, more probability to vote for a party in the opposition; and the greater is the approval of the incumbent national government, the less the probability of voting for one of the opposition parties). This is model is also present for the competition with Podemos (the new radical anti-party system party), the votes for which were mostly due to national issues and the contestation against the incumbent national government.

The scenario is almost the same for Italian EU elections. The major difference is that the parameter for EU distance (the directional EU issue) is relevant for the two Eurosceptic parties (Lega Nord and 5 Stelle), although its effects are small. These results show that party supply also matters, confirming that the presence of this type of parties in the party system could affect partially the nature of party competition (Hobolt et al., 2008; Parsons and Weber, 2011; Silke and Maier, 2011), transforming the EU issue into a positional issue for the supporters of these kinds of parties.

Finally, we have a completely different scenario in Germany, where the EU distance (directional issue model) is especially relevant for the competition among the main parties of the system (CDU/CSU versus SPD; CDU/CSU versus FPD; and finally CDU/CSU versus Die-Grünen). In some cases, the parameters of this variable are similar or superior to that of the L/R distance variable. The major anomaly is the competition for the AfD, a clearly anti-EU party. However, the support for this party could be dominated, as it happens with Podemos in Spain, by an anti-party system vote encapsulated in the national conflict. Anyhow, as we predicted, this is a scenario of EU directional issue voting.

In all the scenarios, respondents' evaluations of the EU performance has no effect on the vote. The same can be said about the importance of the national level variables (L/R distance and National Government approval). Both aspects show that for all these countries European elections are still remarkably SOEs.

This is a very preliminary draft and further statistical tests with additional modeling techniques and more careful thinking should be implemented, but we consider this is exercise as a valid first look at the interactive effect of the consequences of the recent events (crisis) on European integration and the role perceived by citizens of their respective states as pivotal or non-pivotal actors in the EU.

**Table 4: Directional and Sanctioning Issue voting in the EU elections in Spain, Italy and Germany, 2014  
(multinomial regression)**

<b>Spain</b> (Reference PP)					
	<b>PSOE</b>	<b>United Left</b>	<b>Podemos</b>		
L/R Distance (t-1)	0.05*** (0.017)	0.07*** (0.017)	0.08*** (0.016)		
EU Distance (t-1)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)		
Approval National Government (t-1)	-2.88*** (0.479)	-3.9*** (0.805)	-3.76*** (0.506)		
Approval EU decisions (t-1)	-0.001 (0.389)	-0.22 (0.408)	0.29 (0.378)		
Constant	0.92 (1.41)	-2.58 (1.64)	-1.67 (1.36)		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.35				
Log-Likelihood	-977.7				
N	1121				
<b>Italy</b> (Reference PD)					
	<b>Forza Italia</b>	<b>NCD-UDC</b>	<b>Legia Nord</b>	<b>5 Stelle</b>	
L/R Distance (t-1)	0.10*** (0.010)	0.08*** (0.012)	0.09*** (0.011)	0.08*** (0.010)	
EU Distance (t-1)	0.009 (0.007)	-0.008 (0.012)	0.01* (0.007)	0.02*** (0.006)	
Approval National Government (t-1)	-0.20*** (0.082)	-0.02 (0.126)	-0.33*** (0.100)	-0.57*** (0.079)	
Approval EU decisions (t-1)	-0.16** (0.078)	-0.14 (0.104)	-0.09 (0.102)	0.03 (0.076)	
Constant	-4.04*** (1.04)	-3.76** (1.65)	-1.82 (1.82)	1.26 (0.926)	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.30				
Log-Likelihood	-760.3				
N	839				
<b>Germany</b> (Reference CDU-CSU)					
	<b>SPD</b>	<b>FPD</b>	<b>Die-Linke</b>	<b>Die-Grünen</b>	<b>AfD</b>
L/R Distance (t-1)	0.26*** (0.078)	0.10 (0.184)	0.44*** (0.123)	0.44*** (0.105)	0.02 (0.107)
EU Distance (t-1)	0.26*** (0.061)	0.26* (0.133)	0.11 (0.090)	0.26*** (0.074)	0.07 (0.074)
Approval National Government (t-1)	-1.24*** (0.223)	-2.04*** (0.494)	-2.21 (0.386)	-1.94*** (0.278)	-2.27*** (0.309)
Approval EU decisions (t-1)	0.25 (0.213)	0.48 (0.517)	-0.45 (0.437)	0.17 (0.284)	-0.55 (0.425)
Constant	3.49*** (0.849)	-3.02 (1.96)	7.15*** (1.31)	3.74*** (1.04)	-0.10 (1.14)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.27				
Log-Likelihood	-1290.7				
N	1578				

Source: Spanish, Italian and German EES 2014 panels.

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Appendix

**Table A.1: Directional model of voting in the EU elections in Spain, Italy and Germany, 2014 (multinomial regression)**

<b>Spain</b> (Reference PP)					
	<b>PSOE</b>	<b>United Left</b>	<b>Podemos</b>		
L/R Distance (t-1)	-0.21*** (0.070)	-0.28*** (0.053)	-0.29*** (0.066)		
EU Distance (t-1)	-0.0007 (0.0004)	-0.0004 (0.0005)	0.0002 (0.0004)		
EU Knowledge	0.017 (0.200)	0.027 (0.210)	0.06 (0.186)		
LR Scale	-1.21*** (0.136)	-1.24*** (0.146)	-1.01*** (0.127)		
EU Scale	0.002** (0.001)	0.001** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.0006)		
Age	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.010)	-0.03*** (0.008)		
Education	-0.03* (0.009)	-0.03 (0.023)	-0.04* (0.052)		
Religiosity	-0.15 (0.093)	-0.47*** (0.115)	-0.29*** (0.089)		
Constant	4.60*** (1.17)	2.70** (1.31)	4.76 (1.12)		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.29				
Log-Likelihood	-1078.7				
N	1121				
<b>Italy</b> (Reference PD)					
	<b>Forza Italia</b>	<b>NCD-UDC</b>	<b>Lega Nord</b>	<b>5 Stelle</b>	
L/R Distance (t-1)	-0.89*** (0.069)	-0.61*** (0.086)	-0.88*** (0.084)	-0.032*** (0.045)	
EU Distance (t-1)	-0.09* (0.053)	0.02 (0.081)	-0.09 (0.060)	-0.10** (0.044)	
EU Knowledge	0.07 (0.158)	0.21 (0.228)	0.18 (0.192)	-0.07 (0.124)	
LR Scale	-0.19*** (0.070)	-0.03* (0.015)	-0.33*** (0.083)	-0.34*** (0.057)	
EU Scale	0.89*** (0.089)	0.55*** (0.125)	0.88*** (0.110)	0.53*** (0.064)	
Age	0.02* (0.008)	0.01* (0.012)	-0.0007 (0.010)	-0.03*** (0.007)	
Education	-0.04 (0.056)	-0.010 (0.081)	-0.10 (0.073)	-0.09** (0.047)	
Religiosity	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.0008 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.002)	
Constant	6.43*** (0.959)	-6.76*** (1.38)	-5.15 (1.18)	0.99 (0.659)	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.27				
Log-Likelihood	-816.0				
N	873				
<b>Germany</b> (Reference CDU-CSU)					
	<b>SPD</b>	<b>FPD</b>	<b>Die-Linke</b>	<b>Die-Grünen</b>	<b>AfD</b>
L/R Distance (t-1)	0.32*** (0.065)	-0.005 (0.158)	0.60*** (0.103)	0.54*** (0.085)	0.02 (0.087)
EU Distance (t-1)	0.30*** (0.049)	0.32*** (0.111)	0.11 (0.076)	0.25*** (0.058)	0.05 (0.060)
EU Knowledge	0.007 (0.054)	0.17 (0.145)	-0.10 (0.079)	-0.14*** (0.058)	-0.13* (0.067)
LR Scale	-0.81*** (0.090)	-0.21 (0.207)	-1.49*** (0.159)	-0.79*** (0.117)	-0.09 (0.118)
EU Scale	0.20*** (0.055)	0.18 (0.122)	0.16* (0.097)	0.17** (0.068)	0.65*** (0.050)
Age	0.02*** (0.006)	-0.004 (0.013)	0.01 (0.010)	-0.01** (0.007)	-0.004 (0.008)
Education	-0.11*** (0.031)	0.19** (0.074)	-0.007 (0.051)	0.09** (0.036)	0.003 (0.043)
Religiosity	-0.28***	-0.35**	-0.83***	-0.10	-0.19*

	(0.075)	(0.180)	(0.186)	(0.085)	(0.104)
Constant	2.21***	-3.72***	3.23***	2.10***	2.75***
	(0.542)	(1.37)	(0.847)	(0.650)	(0.755)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>			0.21		
Log-Likelihood			-1917.6		
N			1578		

Source: Spanish, Italian and German EES 2014 panels.

**Table A.2: Santioning issue model of voting in the EU elections in Spain, Italy and Germany, 2014 (multinomial regression)**

<b>Spain</b> (Reference PP)					
	<b>PSOE</b>	<b>United Left</b>	<b>Podemos</b>		
Approval National Government on EU (t-1)	-2.98*** (0.466)	-3.87*** (0.861)	-3.56*** (0.505)		
Approval EU decisions (t-1)	-0.086 (0.395)	-0.026 (0.420)	0.28 (0.390)		
National Government responsibility (t-1)	0.17** (0.082)	0.31*** (0.091)	.38*** (0.083)		
EU responsibility (t-1)	0.04 (0.091)	0.03 (0.095)	0.009 (0.089)		
EU Knowledge	0.06 (0.252)	0.12 (0.263)	0.18 (0.245)		
LR Scale	-1.10*** (0.119)	-1.20*** (0.122)	-0.98*** (0.116)		
EU Scale	0.0007 (0.0006)	0.008 (0.0006)	0.001** (0.0005)		
Age	0.02 (0.012)	0.008 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.012)		
Education	-0.02 (0.025)	-0.015 (0.027)	-0.03 (0.026)		
Religiosity	-0.16*** (0.117)	-0.46*** (0.137)	-0.25** (0.116)		
Constant	0.23 (1.39)	-2.88* (1.62)	-1.26 (1.39)		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		0.35			
Log-Likelihood		-981.8			
N		1121			
<b>Italy</b> (Reference PD)					
	<b>Forza Italia</b>	<b>NCD-UDC</b>	<b>Lega Nord</b>	<b>5 Stelle</b>	
Approval National Government on EU (t-1)	-0.28*** (0.067)	-0.11 (0.109)	-0.37*** (0.079)	-0.63*** (0.061)	
Approval EU decisions (t-1)	-0.23*** (0.062)	-0.18* (0.093)	-0.29*** (0.079)	-0.14** (0.057)	
National Government responsibility (t-1)	0.23*** (0.042)	-0.06 (0.074)	0.18*** (0.51)	0.09** (0.039)	
EU responsibility (t-1)	0.24*** (0.053)	0.11 (0.077)	0.19*** (0.063)	0.12*** (0.044)	
EU Knowledge	-0.27** (0.132)	-0.05 (0.204)	-0.10 (0.160)	-0.18 (0.119)	
LR Scale	-0.03 (0.035)	-0.001 (0.054)	-0.14*** (0.042)	-0.07** (0.032)	
EU Scale	-0.06 (0.043)	-0.07 (0.082)	-0.07 (0.051)	0.12*** (0.035)	
Age	0.01** (0.007)	0.007 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.03*** (0.066)	
Education	-0.03 (0.047)	0.016 (0.072)	-0.11* (0.062)	-0.09** (0.043)	
Religiosity	0.0002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.004)	0.0000 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	
Constant	-0.94 (0.838)	-1.47 (1.39)	2.13** (1.02)	4.81*** (0.725)	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		0.24			
Log-Likelihood		-1088.2			
N		1074			
<b>Germany</b> (Reference CDU-CSU)					
	<b>SPD</b>	<b>FPD</b>	<b>Die-Linke</b>	<b>Die-Grünen</b>	<b>AfD</b>
Approval National Government on EU (t-1)	1.13*** (0.198)	-1.90*** (0.442)	-2.33** (0.349)	-1.68*** (0.243)	-2.08*** (0.275)
Approval EU decisions (t-1)	0.13 (0.192)	0.39 (0.464)	-0.62 (0.414)	-0.21 (0.255)	-0.54 (0.373)
National Government responsibility (t-1)	0.04 (0.081)	-0.02 (0.176)	-0.04 (0.122)	-0.02 (0.100)	0.02 (0.106)
EU responsibility (t-1)	-0.06 (0.064)	-0.10 (0.141)	-0.13 (0.100)	-0.02 (0.082)	-0.11 (0.086)

EU Knowledge	0.04 (0.059)	0.05 (0.135)	-0.012 (0.084)	-0.14 (0.067)	-0.10 (0.073)
LR Scale	-0.99*** (0.085)	-0.001 (0.171)	-1.97*** (0.142)	-1.23*** (0.126)	-0.26** (0.109)
EU Scale	-0.05 (0.043)	-0.16 (0.098)	0.09 (0.068)	-0.09 (0.056)	0.51*** (0.068)
Age	0.01** (0.006)	-0.002 (0.013)	0.02 (0.010)	-0.01 (0.008)	-0.01 (0.008)
Education	-0.08** (0.034)	0.16** (0.076)	-0.03 (0.056)	0.10 (0.041)	0.01 (0.048)
Religiosity	-0.26*** (0.080)	-0.27 (0.182)	-0.88*** (0.211)	-0.03 (0.096)	-0.12 (0.113)
Constant	4.70*** (0.727)	-1.10 (1.59)	8.47*** (1.09)	6.10 (0.874)	0.39 (0.944)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>			0.24		
Log-Likelihood			-1572.2		
N			1313		

Source: Spanish, Italian and German EES 2014 panels.