

Habituating to the New Normal in a Post-earthquake Party System: the 2014 European Election in Greece

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Abstract

The article examines the 2014 European election in Greece. Conducted two years after the double-earthquake elections of 2012 and with the country still mired in a protracted economic crisis, our findings largely support the conclusion that this post-‘earthquake’ election can be classified as one of the most classic second-order elections in the history of Greek elections. Both ideology and attribution of blame for the ongoing economic crisis to the PASOK and ND governments to a large extent explain the victory of SYRIZA. At the same time, however, more fundamental positions towards European unification appear to have become more relevant to party choice for the first time since the early 1980s.

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The 2014 election to the European Parliament in Greece has been described as a momentous electoral contest for a number of different reasons. One could highlight the fact this was the first time a party of the radical left, SYRIZA (Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικός Αριστεράς; Coalition of the Radical Left) has received more votes than any other party associated with the traditional left in the history of nationwide election contests in Greece. Alternatively, the focus could be on the further rise of the neo-fascist Golden Dawn-Popular Association (Λαϊκός Σύνδεσμος-Χρυσή Αυγή; GD), continuing a trend first recorded in the 2010 local elections. Golden Dawn emerged as the third-largest party in Greek politics in spite of the imprisonment of its leader and other elected deputies. At the same time, the centre-left PASOK (Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα; Panhellenic Socialist Movement), competing in a national election for the first time in its 40-year history as part of a coalition, continued its steep downward trajectory and transformation from being the most influential of the two parties that dominated the post-authoritarian period (the other being the conservative ND [*Νέα Δημοκρατία*-New Democracy]) to one of the smaller parties in the transition to a new party system. Others choose to focus on the improved performance of SYRIZA, Golden Dawn and the communist KKE (Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας; Communist Party of Greece) collectively, and interpret the result as a victory for populist Eurosceptic forces, reflecting a dramatic change in Greek public opinion, which up until four years ago was one of the most pro-European in the continent (Clements, Nanou & Verney 2014; Freire, Teperoglou & Moury 2014). Another big story in this election has been the emergence of The River (Το Ποτάμι), a new party created by a well-known journalist just two months before the May election. Its short but highly visible campaign relied on an anti-party and reformist message and immediately gained traction with a portion of the electorate.

Many interpret the election result as signalling the complete collapse of the old two-party system that underpinned the Greek Third Republic (established in 1974). A comparison between the results of the 2009 European election with those of 2014 election make it obvious that the party system of 2009 was profoundly different from the one that took shape five years later. In the time between the two European elections, Greece held two parliamentary elections – in May and June 2012, at the peak of the Greek debt crisis and, by extension, of the Eurozone crisis. The double-earthquake elections of 2012 (Voulgaris & Nikolakopoulos 2014) transformed the political landscape in Greece beyond recognition, and one of the central questions of this article is whether the period of transition towards a new party system in Greece is nearing its end or whether the period of extreme volatility continues.

We attempt to answer this question by remaining grounded in the literature on second-order national elections (SOE model), which constitutes the main theoretical paradigm in this field of electoral behaviour studies. At the core of our analysis are the hypotheses first articulated in the seminal study by Reif & Schmitt (1980), along with some recent revisions of the model, the so-called micro-foundations of the SOE model (Schmitt, Sanz & Braun 2009; Hobolt & Wittrock 2011; Clark & Rohrschneider 2009). The main hypothesis of the model about European elections is that there is less at stake compared to first-order national elections (FOE) (Reif & Schmitt 1980, p. 9). In other words, the assumption is that voters do not view European elections as providing the crucial link between voting and the exercise of real political power. The first and overarching objective of the article is to provide insight as to whether the Greek party system is moving towards stability and away

from the extreme fluidity observed at the time of the 2012 elections. By analysing the results of the 2014 European election, testing whether the Greek electorate has treated this election as a low-stimulus national contest and examine the patterns of vote switching, we can gauge whether or not the Greek party system is still far from entering a phase of (re)normalisation.

A secondary (and related) research question is whether voters expressed party preferences in this election with the intention of sending a message to European leaders about austerity policies being implemented in Greece through the European Union (EU). In other words, since the EU has assumed a central role in the country's bailout and ensuing austerity policies, the question is whether the Greek electorate treated the European election as an opportunity to express its dissatisfaction towards both the national government and the EU and its policy agenda.

The attempt to analyse the results of the 2014 European election in Greece using the SOE model comes up against one serious challenge. Previous studies have argued the fact the framework of analysis of the SOE model is built upon consolidated party systems renders the model less useful for the analysis of European elections in EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe, in most of which a stable and consolidated party system has yet to develop (Schmitt 2005, p. 666). Although Greece is not a new democracy, the 2014 party system is in many ways a new system, lacking the stability in patterns of electoral behaviour that characterised the Greek system prior to the onset of the economic crisis. The collapse of the two former major parties and the end of the two-party system, the emergence of new parties and the high levels of volatility complicates any comparison with previous European elections and means we must be careful with our implementation of the SOE assumptions. For this reason, and since Greece remains in the throes of an unprecedented (peacetime) economic downturn, we can say our study could be seen as a test of the SOE model in an exceptional case.

Below we focus on the context of the election. The background and the main dimensions of the election campaign are at the core of our analysis. The following part builds upon the analysis of the results by testing the SOE model. In the final part of the article we employ individual-level data to examine some hypotheses derived from the micro-foundations perspective of the model.

The Context of the 2014 European Election in Greece

During the time between the 2009 and 2014 European elections Greece experienced the most socially turbulent and politically eventful period in decades. As the dust settles from the most severe economic crisis since the 1940s and as the economy begins to show some signs of stabilisation after six years of GDP contraction, Greece is emerging as a different country to that which existed in 2009. It is a much poorer country – about one-quarter of its GDP has been lost,¹ unemployment is hovering around 27 per cent forcing a large proportion of its younger and university-educated people to seek employment abroad.² Standards of living have fallen rapidly, not just in terms of disposable income but also in terms of quality and access to basic social services (health, education, etc.).

Greece's economic problems began in 2008 when, as a result of the 2007 global crisis, the economy experienced its first year of recession after several years of uninterrupted growth. However, at that point few people could have predicted the severity of the economic woes Greece would face less than two years later. In fact, during the first two years of the global economic crisis Greece appeared to be less affected compared to other European countries. The situation changed following the elections of October 2009 that brought PASOK into government after almost five-and-a-half years of ND rule. Investors' fears about the ability of the Greek government to meet its debt payment obligations due to a rising budget deficit led to borrowing costs escalating, which further reinforced fears of a potential default. These fears turned into outright panic in the markets when the new government claimed in October 2009 that the estimated deficit reported by the outgoing ND (3.5 per cent of GDP) had to be revised up to almost 12.7 per cent of GDP, and then 15.2 per cent, by which time borrowing costs had risen to prohibitive levels, meaning that if the country was to avoid a default it had to seek alternative sources to fund its debt obligations. The solution was provided by EU governments and institutions, together with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which agreed to provide Greece with a €110 billion loan, conditional on the implementation of a series of structural reforms and austerity measures stipulated in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU, *mnemonio* in Greek), which was signed in May 2010.

The effect of the implementation of the austerity measures imposed by Greece's international lenders and implemented by five consecutive Greek governments has been a hotly debated topic and had dominated political discourse throughout the four-year period from the spring of 2010 to the spring of 2014,³ giving rise to the neologisms *mnemoniakoi* and *anti-mnemoniakoi* to distinguish between those who viewed the bailout and MoU as a lifeline for the Greek economy and those who believed them to be the very reason why the economic crisis has been so deep and protracted. In the 2010-2011 period, after passing several unpopular bills in parliament the PASOK government's approval ratings fell to record low levels and its parliamentary majority of 160 seats was gradually chipped away as individual deputies refused to support austerity measures. Attempting to regain legitimacy for a second rescue plan along, which included a 50 per cent haircut of the Greek debt to private creditors, in late October 2011 Prime Minister George Papandreou announced the decision to hold a referendum on whether or not Greece should accept the strict conditions of the new loan imposed by the European Central Bank (ECB), European Commission (EC) and IMF. A few days later, however, under intense pressure from European leaders as following a revolt of his own deputies, he was forced to cancel the referendum. Papandreou won the subsequent vote of confidence in parliament only after pledging to form an interim national coalition government. Following intense negotiations, this new government was formed with the involvement of PASOK, ND and the right-wing LAOS (Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός; Popular Orthodox Rally). One of ND's demands was that Papandreou step down as prime minister. Papandreou's successor was Lucas Papademos, a former vice-president of the ECB, who was given a mandate to conclude the agreed haircut with private-sector creditors.

The rapidly shifting socio-economic landscape, coupled with the massive loss of confidence in the old major parties, gave rise to a political environment in which old party loyalties were being eradicated and new fault lines were forming (Teperoglou & Tsatsanis 2014). The result was the double-earthquake elections of 2012 that overturned the previous party system. In the first election, in May 2012, no party managed to receive more than 19 per

cent of the vote (in a system in which previously PASOK and ND combined would win around 80 per cent), SYRIZA almost quadrupled its voting share (from 4.5 per cent in 2009 to 16.7 per cent) to become the second-largest party behind ND. Golden Dawn catapulted onto the national scene, obtaining 7 per cent, a remarkable electoral breakthrough given that in the previous elections it had managed only 0.3 per cent of the vote, while the right-wing populist ANEL (Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες; Independent Greeks) obtained an impressive 10.6 per cent, despite being formed only a few months before the election. In the June election ND and PASOK managed to capture almost 42 per cent of the vote between them, mainly due to an 11 per cent increase in the ND vote (SYRIZA's share of the vote also increased by 10 per cent, solidifying its place as the official opposition). Along with the centre-left DIMAR (Δημοκρατική Αριστερά; Democratic Left), a new party formed out of the moderate wing of SYRIZA just two years before, ND and PASOK formed a coalition government. DIMAR left the coalition a year later, following the decision of the ND-dominated government to abolish the Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation (ERT) after this had been categorically rejected by the junior coalition partner. Since the 2012 elections, which had been held at the peak of the Eurozone crisis, while scenarios of Greece exiting the Eurozone or even the EU (the 'Grexit') were being entertained in the international press, the social unrest in the country had subsided, as did the fears that Greece would leave the Eurozone, at least in the short- to medium-term. However, as we shall see below, the themes dominating the European election campaign in the spring of 2014 were not too dissimilar from those that dominated the campaign in the spring of 2012.

The Election Campaign

Data from pre-election surveys reveal that interest in the European election was high. According to a survey by polling firm *Public Issue*, interest in the election reached 60 per cent at the beginning of May 2014 and 71 per cent just few days before the poll.⁴ In another survey conducted by the University of Macedonia, the European election was classed the most important contest of the three elections being held that day (European, municipal, prefectural) reaching 60 per cent, while the other two SOE lagged far behind (26 and 4.5 per cent, respectively).⁵ News consumption on the European election from all media sources (TV, radio and internet) remained at a satisfactory level for an SOE (56 per cent said they followed news on the European election). However, this was 22 per cent lower than the level of information recorded for the national elections of 2012 (*Public Issue*).⁶

In terms of the content of the party campaigns, the fact the second round of municipal and prefectural elections coincided with the European election further contributed to overshadowing the pan-European nature of the election to the European Parliament. Most parties adopted a single campaign strategy for all contests, thereby blurring the boundaries between the different political arenas. For example, one of the central mottos of SYRIZA's campaign was 'Three polls, one vote'. Furthermore, despite the attempt by European political parties to emphasise the supranational character of the 2014 European election through an agreement to link the position of the president of the EC to the result of the election, and specifically to one of the candidates previously selected by each of the major European political parties, the campaign in Greece was again dominated by national issues. Although Alexis Tsipras, leader of SYRIZA, was the candidate for the Party of the European Left, the radical left party and its leader did not focus on European issues other than the austerity policies sweeping through the European periphery. SYRIZA tried to frame the

European election as a referendum on the MoU and the government's record. The main slogans of its campaign were 'Today we vote, tomorrow they leave' and Greece goes 'Left for the first time', as if the election result would determine the composition of the national government. Similarly, ND's campaign framed the election as a referendum on its record in government over the previous two years and a choice between 'stability and chaos'. Prime Minister Samaras and his party attempted to take credit for pulling the country back from the brink of bankruptcy and collapse, and sought to portray the first half of its four-year term as a success story and, at the same time, to stress that a SYRIZA victory in Europe could derail the country's fragile economic recovery.

PASOK joined the 'Olive Tree' (Ελιά) coalition with a few minor social democratic parties formed after the onset of the crisis, largely by individuals associated with PASOK prior to the party's electoral decline and its latest change of leadership.⁷ Olive Tree was intended to be a broad coalition seeking to revive the Greek centre-left in a manner similar to the Italian project of the 1990s, even though in reality it failed to attract any significant political forces outside PASOK. The leader of PASOK and Deputy Prime Minister, Evangelos Venizelos, attempted to present Olive Tree as a pro-European, social democratic alternative to SYRIZA but, at the same time often alluded to the possibility of leaving the coalition government should the coalition perform poorly in the election (without ever clearly specifying any particular threshold). This was interpreted by pundits across the political spectrum as a thinly-veiled attempt to extort pro-European, centrist voters to vote for Olive Tree and arrest the haemorrhaging of its support to ND and The River.

The right-wing populist ANEL placed greater emphasis on the election's European dimension, although from a strictly nationalist perspective. Its main slogans were 'No to a Europe of bankers and speculators, yes to a Europe of people' and 'For a strong Greece inside Europe'. Just as during the 2012 national election, the party's main pledge was to reject the terms of the MoU and to unilaterally restructure the national debt. This pledge was once again accompanied with accusations that the government had surrendered Greek sovereignty to foreign private and state interests. The Golden Dawn campaign employed the slogans 'Europe of nations, not of banks' and 'For a strong Greece in Europe' alongside the familiar mottos 'Greece for Greeks' and 'To rid this land of filth'. Despite the clear Eurosceptic orientation of its campaign, it maintained its focus on the familiar themes of immigration, political corruption and the party's anti-systemic credentials – all at a time when the party's leader, Nikos Michaloliakos, was in jail alongside other members of the party leadership, awaiting trial on criminal charges, including establishing and running a criminal organisation.

KKE kept faith with its previous national election campaign, which was built around the slogan 'No to the EU and monopolies' shackles'. It again tried to portray itself as the one truly Eurosceptic party, presenting an EU exit as the only possible solution to the economic crisis. For its part, DIMAR entered into a period of intense internal struggles over such issues as its decision to walk out of the coalition government in 2013 and the leadership's refusal to negotiate a possible entry into the Olive Tree coalition due to the presence of PASOK. Instead, party leader Fotis Kouvelis attempted to create a rival centre-left group by establishing a European election candidate list (Δημοκρατική Αριστερά- Προοδευτική Συνεργασία ; Democratic Left-Progressive Cooperation), which included people from outside the party, mostly former PASOK politicians who had broken away from the party

due to its association with former PASOK leaders such as Kostas Simitis and George Papandreou. The party's main slogan was 'Against austerity and populism', which it employed in an attempt to distance itself from both the leftist populism of SYRIZA and the austerity policies of the governing coalition.

Despite being a newcomer to Greek politics and with no veteran politicians in its ranks, The River gathered a lot of media attention during the campaign period. The party leader, Stavros Theodorakis, was an accomplished and renowned journalist with privileged access to a number of media outlets. The party's initially high initial polling figures also fuelled media attention. The River's campaign strategy emphasised its lack of ties to the old party system and rejection of standard categorisations of its identity on the left-right spectrum. In articles and interviews, the Theodorakis consistently presented The River as a pragmatic, reform-minded and 'anti-populist' party that was unconstrained by ideological dogma. It is no accident Theodorakis refused to reveal which European parliamentary group the potential elected members would join, holding talks with the Socialists & Democrats (S&D), the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) and the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) groups. Finally, after the election, the party's two MEPs joined the S&D group. Even though the pro-European orientation of the party was made clear from the outset, the talking points dominating campaign focused on national issues, certainly in an attempt to introduce the Greek electorate to a new party that lacked ideologically clear points of reference.

The Results of the 2014 European Elections in Greece: Second-Order Effects under Exceptional Cases?

The Less at Stake Dimension of the Second-Order Election Model and Hypotheses at the Aggregate Level

The fact there is less at stake in European elections compared to FOE has consequences in two different aspects of electoral behaviour: one concerns participation levels; while the other is related to electoral choices. Reif & Schmitt (1980) predict the following outcomes in European elections: 1) turnout is expected to be lower compared to the previous FOE; 2) the vote share of parties in government is expected to be lower compared to the preceding FOE; 3) not only is it the parties that form the government at the time of the European election that will perform worse, but all the large parties, regardless of whether they are in government or not; 4) the low-stimulus elections are characterised as a 'big day' for the small parties, as they are expected to gain votes compared to the preceding national contest. Small protest parties of the left and the right and new parties tend to perform better (Reif & Schmitt 1980, pp. 17-25; Reif 1997, p. 118). A central proposition of the model is that the magnitude of loss is related to the timing of the European election in the FOE election cycle (Reif & Schmitt 1980; Van der Eijk & Franklin 1996). Government parties perform worse when SOE take place during the mid-term period of the election cycle (for a detailed presentation of the hypotheses, see Schmitt & Teperoglou's introduction to this volume).

Turnout

According to the SOE model, citizens are less motivated to participate in a low-stimulus election because no government will be formed. Therefore, the rationale behind this decision is related to the absent 'electoral mental connection' between the electorate and the elected European Parliament. Moreover, some of them might be dissatisfied supporters of the government party, who by choosing to abstain wish to send a (weak) signal to their party (Schmitt 2009, p. 527). In 2014 turnout reached 59.97 per cent, which is the second-lowest turnout in for European elections in Greece. There was a 2.5 and 5 per cent decline from the FOE of May and June 2012, respectively. Nevertheless, even if 274,602 fewer voters went to the polls two years after the FOE, participation in the 2014 European election in Greece remained at a high level compared to the European average (43.09 per cent). In addition, it increased almost 7.4 per cent compared to the 2009 European election, which was the election with the lowest turnout of any election in modern Greece (see Figure A1 in the online Appendix). Another interesting comparison is that with the participation levels in the first round of the local elections that took place just one week before the European election. The participation rate was 61.56 per cent, a fall of 1.6 percent between the two types of SOE, which confirmed previous findings that participation in European elections is even lower than in other SOE (Reif 1985, p. 16). These observations generally confirm the first aggregate hypothesis of the SOE model, that turnout is expected to be lower in European elections compared to the previous national contest, even though the decline in participation this time was very modest. One could cite two reasons for this. First, the lower difference between the latest FOE and SOE elections can in part be attributed to the broader trend of declining participation in all types of elections in Greece: in other words, the lower discrepancy is more an artefact of the steep decline in FOE participation rates than high participation in the European election. Second, previous studies confirm that when a European election takes place at the same time as another election – whether FOE or SOE – there is greater motivation for voting (Schmitt 2005, pp. 656–657). The second round of local elections could be one possible explanation for the relatively high turnout. However, other factors related to the context of the election are probably equally important in determining turnout levels. The referendum nature of the election focusing on the dilemmas described above and the polarised first-order political arena are factors that cannot be dismissed from our analysis. Furthermore, it could be argued these factors have somehow overshadowed the remarkably high level of citizen dissatisfaction with national and supranational institutions (Greek and European Parliament, parties, government, the EU. See Teperoglou & Tsatsanis 2014; Verney 2014; Clements, Nanou & Verney 2014) and the fear of the spill over effect of both disillusionment and of increased Euroscepticism in the decision whether or not to vote.

In terms of the reasons for abstention given by the respondents in the online post-electoral *2014 Hellenic Panel Study 2014* we use for the purposes of this paper,⁸ dissatisfaction with politics and a perceived lack of representation by political parties was selected by little more than 25 per cent of the respondents who abstained. About 10 per cent cited a reason that was related to low external political efficacy (vote does not change anything), which does not make clear to what extent it is connected with a perceived lack of electoral connection, which is endemic in European elections, or to which low external efficacy levels in general can be attributed. Practical difficulties were by far the most common reason, which raise suspicions there is a strong social desirability bias effect (see Figure A2 in the online

Appendix). Conversely, reasons related to lack of mobilisation or stances towards the EU were selected by a very small proportion of respondents, confirming previous studies (Schmitt & Van der Eijk 2007; and for an overview, Schmitt & Teperoglou 2015).

Government Parties' Losses and Small Parties' Gains

The 2014 European elections in Greece took place during the mid-term of the FOE cycle, at a time when we would expect the government to be at its least popular. Unlike at other points in the electoral cycle, there is widespread consensus that punishment of the incumbent and mid-term losses constitute a stable SOE pattern. The results do indeed confirm anti-government swings: ND received a smaller share of the vote compared to June 2012 (22.7 per cent) a decrease of 6.9 per cent, and 526,784 fewer votes. Compared with the 2009 European election, the party lost three seats in the European Parliament and its electoral strength fell by 9.6 per cent.

The junior government party, competing as Olive Tree, obtained 8.2 per cent of the vote, 4.3 per cent less and with 297,621 fewer votes since the last FOE. However, nothing better exemplifies the transition to a new party system than a comparison of the PASOK/Olive Tree electoral strength in 2014 with that of 2009: a fall of 36.7 percentage points and a loss of six MEPs.

By contrasting the losses of the incumbent parties in all the four Greek mid-term European elections (1984, 1999, 2009 and 2014), we see that the 2014 losses are the highest: government party losses in 2014 appear to constitute the most severe expression of 'voting with the boot' (Oppenhuis, Van der Eijk & Franklin 1996, pp. 301–304) with a combined loss for ND and PASOK/Olive Tree of 11.2 percentage points. The previous highest one occurred in the 2009 European election, when the ruling ND, led by Costas Karamanlis, lost 9.5 per cent of the vote compared to the 2007 general election (Teperoglou 2010).

This is the third time in the history of the Greek European elections that the main opposition party has won.⁹ SYRIZA obtained 26.6 per cent of the vote, electing six MEPs. Comparing its vote share with the 2009 election, we note its upward swing mirrors, to some extent, PASOK's downward swing: an increase of 21.9 per cent and five MEPs. It is the first time in the history of Greek elections that a party of the radical left has acquired a plurality of votes in a national election. However, comparison with the last FOE reveals that SYRIZA's speedy rise had already occurred by the summer of 2012. The proportional strength of SYRIZA actually fell by 0.3 percentage points, and in absolute terms the party lost 136,414 votes compared to the June 2012 election. In other words, after the double-earthquake elections of 2012, SYRIZA's electoral dynamic follows a trajectory of consolidation and stability (confirmed also by vote switching patterns; see Table 2). The result for a major opposition party by winning first place in the elections as a result of suffering fewer losses than the major government party is in line with the predictions of the SOE model. The fortunes of SYRIZA in the 2014 European election is one of the strongest indications that, in some respects, the Greek party system has entered a period of normalisation and is approaching a new equilibrium in a post-earthquake political environment.

[Table 1 about here]

Moving on to the smaller parties, we explore the ‘small-party gain’ hypothesis in two ways. The first by contrasting each parties’ share of the vote with the June 2012 results. The second way is to calculate the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP) using the Laakso and Taagepera (1979) formula (see also Schmitt 2009, p. 530) for the European election and the preceding FOE, with the expectation the ENEP will be higher for the European election. In terms of the latter, the ENEP in the European election (6.8) is higher than the one for the June 2012 election (5.2), but lower than the unprecedented high figure in the May 2012 election (9.0). In terms of the former, the results are somewhat contradictory. More specifically, we can identify one group of small parties that have clearly benefited. Golden Dawn won 9.4 per cent (2.5 per cent higher than the previous FOE) and elected three MEPs. KKE gained 6.1 per cent of the vote and elected two MEPs (an increase of 1.6 per cent compared to previous FOE). The River’s successful electoral debut is also in line with the SOE hypothesis that small new parties entering the second-order political arena will benefit from the fact there is less at stake than in a national election. The new party managed to capture 6.6 per cent of the vote and elected two MEPs.

Despite failing to reach the 3 per cent electoral threshold required to elect an MEP, the right-wing populist LAOS (Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός; Popular Orthodox Rally) was also one of the parties to perform better in relation to the previous FOE, where it had experienced a disastrous showing (1.6 per cent). It is worth noting the electoral performance of the party of the Muslim minority DEB (Κόμμα Ισότητας, Φιλίας και Ειρήνης; Party of Equality, Friendship and Peace), which obtained 0.75 per cent nationally, but in Rodopi and Xanthi, the two regions of Eastern Macedonia-Thrace where the old Muslim minority is concentrated, it received 41.7 and 26.0 per cent, respectively. Finally, Greek European Citizens’ (Έλληνες Ευρωπαίοι Πολίτες), which was launched before the elections under the slogan ‘A strong voice of Greeks in the European Parliament’, obtained a total of 1.4 per cent.¹⁰

The second group of small parties consists of those that did not profit from the low-stimulus nature of the election. ANEL lost ground compared to the 2012 election (3.5 per cent and elected one MEP compared to 7.5 per cent), in some ways paying for the intra-party squabbles that had plagued it since the 2012 elections. However, it was DIMAR that suffered the most catastrophic result, falling to 10th place by capturing only 1.2 per cent (a fall of 5.05 per cent since June 2012). The reasons for the party’s collapse remains a bone of contention: the left blames the party’s 12-month involvement as a junior partner in the government; while moderates from both within and outside the party say the exact opposite explanation, claiming DIMAR’s defeat can be attributed to its decision to walk out of the coalition government in June 2013.

Micro-level Analysis of the 2014 European Election

Our individual-level analysis is two-fold. First, we explore and analyse patterns of vote switching, with an emphasis on the move from government to opposition parties in the European election. Second, we attempt to explain voter choice for each party individually by employing a set of independent variables that relate to the context of the election.

Vote Switching

For our analysis of vote switching we first chose to provide a general picture by relying on exit poll data due to the greater size and representativeness of the sample. The exit poll data reveal some interesting patterns in terms of vote switching between the previous FOE and the 2014 European election. SYRIZA and Golden Dawn were the most successful parties in terms of retaining their voters. Of the voters who had voted for one of the two parties in June 2012 and who voted in the European election, about three-quarters cast their ballot for the same party. For ND the figure was lower, at 63.2 per cent with 9.0 and 7.8 per cent of previous ND voters switching to SYRIZA and Golden Dawn, respectively. Even though Olive Tree managed to come in fourth (opinion polls during the campaign repeatedly placed them fifth or sixth, behind The River and KKE), the PASOK-backed coalition only managed to retain four out of every 10 of its 2012 voters who returned to vote in 2014. About 25 per cent switched to SYRIZA, with 10 per cent voting for The River. Both SYRIZA and The River together attracted almost half of DIMAR's 2012 electorate; while only 16.6 per cent of those who voted for the party that would become the third government coalition partner in 2012 chose the same party in 2014.

[Table 2 about here]

A central question is whether voters decided to vote differently in the SOE on the basis of sincere party preferences, or whether there was strategic voting switching in an attempt to send the government a message of disapproval. To answer this question we turn once again to the *2014 Hellenic Panel Study*. In order to test the 'sincere voting' hypothesis (also known as 'voting with the heart', see Oppenhuis, Van der Eijk & Franklin 1996, pp. 301–304) on government party defectors, we performed a logistic regression employing ideological distance from SOE to FOE vote on the left-right dimension (self-placement score minus placement of chosen party) and a similar variable for SOE to FOE distance on the EU unification dimension (for similar approaches, see Hobolt & Wittrock 2011, p. 33; Schmitt, Sanz & Braun 2009, p. 6–7). The hypothesis is that the greater the distance on the left-right and the EU unification dimension (which is used a proxy for Euroscepticism versus Europeanism) between the voter's self-placement and their placement of the party, the greater the probability that the voter will defect from one of the two government parties. In order to test the 'strategic voting' hypothesis (also known as 'voting with the head', see Oppenhuis, Van der Eijk & Franklin 1996, pp. 301–304), we employ a dummy variable of approval of the government's record. The hypothesis is that voters who express disapproval of the performance of the incumbent government are more likely to defect from parties in government in order to signal their discontent, even though they remain psychologically and ideologically closer to the party they voted for in the FOE.

[Table 3 about here]

[Figure 1 about here]

Our model (see Table 3) includes several control variables that are important for an exploration of vote switching patterns (party identification, interest in politics, egocentric retrospective economic situation). The results reveal the existence of a clear pattern of 'sincere voting', in terms of the strong impact of distance on the left-right dimension from FOE to SOE party, and the probability of defecting from ND or PASOK/Olive Tree to one of the opposition parties. Conversely, distance on the EU unification dimension appears to

have no discernible impact on the probability of switching from government to opposition parties. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the logistic regression coefficients, in Figure 1 we graphically represent the predicted probabilities of vote switching according to changes in FOE to SOE distance on both the left-right and the EU unification dimensions.

However, ‘sincere voting’ appears to coexist with ‘strategic voting’ as disapproval of governmental performance appears to have a statistically-significant impact on the probability of defecting from one of the incumbent parties to an opposition party, even when controlling for other variables. This seems to suggest there are different motivational forces at work simultaneously (for a similar interpretation, see Schmitt, Sanz & Braun 2009, p. 17).

Determinants of the Vote

In order to explore determinants of vote choice in the 2014 European election at the individual level, we again rely on data from the *2014 Hellenic Panel Study*. We perform a multinomial logistic regression on our dependent variable, which includes six categories, corresponding to the first six parties in terms of votes in the election (SYRIZA, ND, GD, Olive Tree, The River and KKE), which captured a combined total of 79.4 percent of the vote. The results of the multinomial logistic regression are presented in Table A1 in the online Appendix.

Our model includes a set of socio-demographic variables: sex, age (dummies of age categories), education, rural residence (dummy), unemployed status (dummy), retired status (dummy) and public-sector employee (dummy). We also include party identification (dummy) as an additional control variable. Our final set of selected variables is intended to explore the impact of factors related to the context of the election: two five-point scales for blame attribution for the crisis (one for the Greek government and another for the European Union), an 11-point scale for support for further EU unification (as a proxy for the measurement of Euroscepticism), a four-point scale for satisfaction with democracy in Greece (used as a proxy measure for political system support), a five-point scale for the retrospective evaluation (previous 12 months) of the respondents’ personal economic situation (to capture degree of the impact of the economic crisis on personal finances) and the classic 11-point left-right self-placement index, given that left-right ideology has traditionally been a strong determinant of voter choice in Greece.

Before examining the impact of attitudinal variables, we believe it is instructive to map the distribution of the vote according to the basic socio-demographic categories. Generally speaking, the findings in our model are in agreement with the analysis of the exit poll data (see Table 4). ND and the Olive Tree fare much better among the older age groups, to the extent that there appears to be a linear positive relationship between age and vote strength for the incumbent parties. ND captures 39 per cent of the over-65 vote, and Olive Tree 14.4 per cent, meaning the two government parties enjoy an absolute majority (53.4 per cent) of older voters. Conversely, they receive their lowest combined share, only 20 per cent of the vote (14.4 per cent and 5.3 per cent, respectively), among voters aged 18-24. The strength of SYRIZA is much more evenly distributed across the age groups, although it receives its lowest share of the vote (21.3 per cent) from those aged 65 and over, trailing ND by almost 18 percentage points.

Unlike the situation with the two government parties, Golden Dawn and The River fare much better among younger respondents than among those aged 45 and older. The same two parties have the greatest imbalances in terms of the vote distribution according to sex: male Golden Dawn voters clearly outnumber their female counterparts, whereas the opposite is true for voters who chose The River. In terms of education, the interesting pattern can be found once again among voters of the two government parties; they clearly perform much better among respondents with elementary-level education or lower (32.6 and 13.4 per cent, respectively). The distribution of voters of other parties according to education level is much more even, with the exception of The River, which tends to attract proportionally more voters with university education than voters with elementary-level or secondary-level education only. Finally, in terms of the distribution of the vote between occupational groups, the most interesting patterns reveal that ND and Olive Tree voters are overrepresented among retirees (33.8 and 13.2 per cent, respectively), while ND performs strongly among homemakers (33.8 per cent) and people who work in the primary sector (27.7 per cent). Conversely, SYRIZA tends to fare much better among both public- and private-sector employees (30.9 and 28.8 per cent, respectively), as well as among self-employed professionals (29.6 per cent) and the unemployed (30 per cent). Given SYRIZA's clear anti-austerity platform, it is no surprise it was the most popular party, by a considerable margin, among the unemployed. However, SYRIZA's clear lead also among salaried and self-employed professionals contradicts a prevailing wisdom among many influential pundits in Greece, which argues that the 'populist' and confrontational rhetoric adopted by SYRIZA tends to alarm members of the more productive and dynamic strata in Greek society, who choose to turn to the two former major parties in search of stability. On the contrary, socio-demographic data reveal once again (as in the 2012 June election) that voters for the two government parties tend disproportionately to be those with lower qualifications, the more elderly, those employed in the primary sector or who are out of the labour force altogether (such as the retired and homemakers).

[Table 4 about here]

In order to examine the impact of attitudinal variables on vote choice, we return to our multinomial logistic regression model. We chose not to focus on the actual regression coefficients, but rather to present the results in a more intuitive way. In Figure 2 we graphically represent the proportional predicted change in the probability of voting for each party by an increase of one standard deviation in the value of each independent variable,¹¹ while all other variables are kept constant (for a similar approach, see Magalhães 2014, p. 189).

[Figure 2 about here]

One of the most interesting findings is that blaming the EU for the economic crisis appears to have negligible effects on vote choice, with the exception of a modest negative effect on the probability of voting for The River. Along with the Olive Tree voters, those who supported the new party clearly emerge as the more pro-European segment of the electorate. Attribution of blame towards the government appears to have clear effects on the probability of choosing certain parties in an expected direction. There is a strong negative impact on the probability of voting for Olive Tree and (less) for ND, as well as a substantial positive impact on the probability of voting SYRIZA. Positions in favour of further

European unification have a strong positive impact on the probability of voting Olive Tree and The River, while they have an adverse effect on the probability of voting KKE, SYRIZA or Golden Dawn. A similar picture emerges when examining the impact of our proxy variable for political support on voter choice. Satisfaction with democracy increases the probability of voting for The River and Olive Tree (mainly), as well as for ND, while dissatisfaction with democracy increases the probability of choosing SYRIZA, Golden Dawn or KKE. Although this finding is hardly surprising in terms of the contrast between the two government parties and the main opposition parties (SYRIZA, Golden Dawn, KKE) due to the espousal of varied anti-systemic themes by the latter – in terms of both intensity and content – the voters of The River appear to be making a clear differentiation between specific and diffuse political support. While satisfaction with democracy is not a very good indicator of diffuse political support, one can surmise that the appeal to voters of the new party's central message against the old parties and political personnel coexists with high levels of support towards the political regime.

Moving on to the other variables, as one would expect, a deteriorating personal economic situation has a positive effect on the probability of voting SYRIZA, while the probability of voting for The River or Olive Tree increases with improving personal finances over the previous year. Finally, ideological orientation (measured by left-right self-placement) in yet another Greek election emerges as the strongest determinant of vote choice, despite the fact that the country has moved to a very different party system.

Concluding Remarks

Two years after the double-earthquake elections of 2012, the 2014 European election was a contest that presented some signs that the party system was stabilising on a new equilibrium – which we refer to in the title as 'the new normal'. This is not to say the Greek party system has acquired the level of stability it had before 2010. About one-in-three voters again opted for a different party in the 2014 European election from those they chose in the June 2012 poll. The transition towards a new party system that was clearly in progress during the parliamentary elections of 2012 is still under way. However, we need to keep in mind that higher volatility levels are to be expected in an SOE. Nevertheless, while vote switching levels remained high, they were considerably lower than the volatility levels of the previous two consecutive FOEs in 2012 (60 and 40 per cent, respectively). In addition, some of the important new features of the party system that emerged in the 2012 elections appear to have persisted two years later. Indeed, by looking at the aggregate results, one gets the impression the extreme fluidity and volatility that characterised Greek politics in 2011 and 2012 are gradually dissipating.

We can now argue with more certainty that the duopoly of PASOK and ND, marked by their alternating single-party governments, belongs to the past. The two former rivals have lost much of their electoral strength and due to the emergence of parties that are hostile to the old political establishment, their relationship has turned from antagonistic to symbiotic. SYRIZA has consolidated much of its electoral base after its spectacular rise in 2012 and has replaced PASOK as the main party for left-of-centre voters. Golden Dawn has also managed to consolidate and expand its electoral base, beating repeated predictions thus far about a meteoric rise and fall, a trajectory that has been followed by many protest parties in Europe. The same cannot be said about other parties, such as DIMAR and ANEL, which emerged at

the peak of the economic crisis. Their poor performance in the 2014 European election, coupled with the successful debut of The River, are a reminder that the new party system in Greece is far from consolidated. There is still a sizeable ‘floating’ electorate that constitutes a legacy of the crisis in Greece and this might well prove to be one of the characteristics of the ‘new normal’ in Greek politics.

An additional indication that the Greek party system is undergoing a gradual process of (re)normalisation is that even under a continuing context of polarisation, the results of the first post-earthquake election displayed many of the features predicted by the SOE model. Indeed, the 2014 European election can perhaps be classified as one of the most classic SOEs in the history of Greek elections: lower levels of participation, severe mid-term losses for the incumbent parties and victory for the major opposition party, small-party gains (even if not for them all), a clear manifestation of ‘voting with the heart’ as well as ‘voting with the boot’. The classification of the election as a typical SOE is strengthened by the fact that domestic issues seemed once again to trump European issues in the campaign. At the level of the electorate, blame attribution for the crisis appeared to have an impact on party choice as a domestic issue only. At the same time, more abstract stances towards European unification are starting to become more relevant to party choice for the first time since the early 1980s. Positions in favour or against the European project appear to be aligned with stances towards the political regime, forming a significant second axis of competition alongside the traditional left-right axis. This constitutes another departure from the previous party system, which was characterised by an overwhelmingly pro-European electorate. One can only speculate as to whether this new feature of the Greek party system will evolve into a stable cleavage or whether it is one of these ephemeral divisions that will disappear once Greece enters the road to economic recovery in earnest.

¹ Real GDP growth was -3.1 per cent in 2009, -4.9 per cent in 2010, -7.1 per cent in 2011, - 7.0 per cent in 2012 and -3.9 per cent in 2013. Greece’s GDP has been continuously contracting from the third quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2014 (Eurostat).

² 27.3 per cent in May 2014 (National Statistical Service of Greece).

³ PASOK government headed by George Papandreou; PASOK, ND and LAOS government headed by former European Bank vice-president Lucas Papademos; caretaker government headed by Greek judge Panagiotis Pikrammenos; ND, PASOK and DIMAR government headed by Antonis Samaras; and New Democracy and PASOK government headed by Antonis Samaras.

⁴ ‘Survey of Political Conjuncture’ (May 2014); N=1005; fieldwork: 29 April-6 May 2014 and ‘European Elections of 25th May 2014 Vote Estimate I Wave’ (22 May 2014); N=1210; fieldwork: 19-22 May 2014. Both surveys were conducted for the newspaper ‘Efhmerida ton Suntakton’.

⁵ Survey conducted by Public Opinion and Market Research Unit, University of Macedonia for SKAI TV; N=1003; fieldwork: 15-24 May 2014.

⁶ “European Elections of 25th May 2014 Vote Estimate I Wave” (22 May 2014), see endnote 4.

⁷ Olive Tree was founded in March 2014 to contest the European election following a failed attempt by 58 intellectuals (including academics, former politicians and artists) to build a broad centre-left coalition, that included PASOK and DIMAR. In the end, the coalition included PASOK and a few minor parties/civil society groups: Agreement for the New Greece (Συμφωνία για τη Νέα Ελλάδα), Dynamic Greece (Δυναμική Ελλάδα) and New Reformers (Νέοι Μεταρρυθμιστές).

⁸ The post-electoral survey *Hellenic Panel Study 2014* (HPS: EES 2014) was conducted by the Laboratory of Applied Political Research, Aristotle University Thessaloniki within the framework of the European Election Study (EES) 2014 (Andreadis et al. 2014). It was a web survey on a non-probability sample. In an attempt to avoid biased estimates, weights have been constructed for gender, age, recoded education, modified regions and valid votes. See more details, Andreadis, I. (2014).

⁹ In the two previous European elections there was an alternation between the two former major parties: in 1999 the opposition ND emerged as the winner, and in 2009, PASOK gained more votes than the governing ND.

¹⁰ Its founder, Chatzimarkakis, was a former German politician, elected MEP with the Free Democrats, who was accused of plagiarism in 2011.

¹¹ We chose to present the *proportional* predicted change in the probability to vote for each party in an attempt to address the unequal distribution of support for each party in the sample and to render the results comparable across different parties regardless of size. For this reason, each predicted change in probability is divided by the proportional share of the vote for each party in the sample. The initial values of the predicted changes in probability are obtained by executing the `prchange` Stata command on our multinomial logit model.

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Table 1. Results of the 2014 European Election (EP) in Greece Compared with the 2009 European Election and the June 2012 Legislative Election (Leg)

Parties	EP 2014 %	EP 2009 %	Leg June 2012 %	EP 2014- Leg June 2012 % Difference	EP 2014 seats	EP 2009 seats
SYRIZA	26.57	4.70	26.89	-0.32	6	1
ND	22.72	32.30	29.66	-6.94	5	8
Golden Dawn	9.39	0.46	6.92	2.47	3	0
Olive Tree	8.02	36.65*	12.28*	-4.26	2	8
The River	6.6	-	-	-	2	-
KKE	6.11	8.35	4.5	1.61	2	2
Independent Greeks	3.46	-	7.51	-4.05	1	-
LAOS	2.69	7.15	1.58	1.11	0	2
Greek European Citizens	1.44	-	-	-	0	-
DIMAR	1.2	-	6.25	-5.05	0	-
Others	8.95	10.39	4.41	4.54	0	1
Turnout	59.33	52.54	62.49			
Blank/invalid ballots	3.8	2.54	0.99			

Source: Authors' own elaboration based on data by the Hellenic Ministry of Interior (www.ypes.gr)

* Comparison with the percentages of PASOK

Table 2. 2014 European Vote by June 2012 Legislative Election Vote (Vote Switching), %

		May 2014 European election									
		ND	SYRIZA	OLIVE TREE	ANEL	GD	DIMAR	KKE	River	Other	Total
June 2012 Legislative election	ND	63.2	9.0	2.1	2.2	7.8	0.1	0.8	3.5	11.3	100.0
	SYRIZA	2.4	77.2	1.6	1.1	2.4	0.6	1.7	4.9	8.1	100.0
	PASOK	6.0	25.8	39.6	1.6	3.9	1.3	2.0	10.1	9.7	100.0
	ANEL	6.7	16.3	3.0	36.7	8.0	0.9	0.4	5.5	22.5	100.0
	GD	5.6	4.9	1.6	1.9	75.3	0.0	0.6	1.6	8.5	100.0
	DIMAR	5.7	20.9	8.9	3.4	0.0	16.6	1.6	25.4	17.5	100.0
	KKE	1.8	16.3	0.4	1.2	3.1	1.0	66.9	2.3	7.0	100.0
	Other	3.3	11.5	0.0	0.0	4.9	0.9	0.8	13.4	65.2	100.0
	Abst.	15.7	25.3	4.6	5.2	10.4	2.1	4.2	8.1	24.4	100.0

Source: Authors' own elaboration based on the *Joint Opinion, MRB, Alco, Metron Analysis 2014 European election exit poll*, N= 6,730

Table 3. Logistic Regression of Voters for Government Parties in June 2012 who Switched to Opposition Parties in the 2014 European Election Compared to Loyal Government Voters

Variables	B		S.E.
Left-Right distance FOE-SOE	.53	***	.14
EU distance FOE-SOE	-.11		.11
Interest in politics	.59	**	.24
Party identification	-1.83	***	.42
Evaluation govt. performance (bad)	3.28	***	.44
Worse personal economic situation (retrospective)	-.75	***	.25
Intercept	-1.10		.93
Nagelkerke Pseudo-R ²	.58		
N	320		

Source: Authors' own elaboration based on the Hellenic Panel Study: European Election Study 2014, weighted data


*Sig≤0.10; **Sig≤0.05 and ***Sig≤0.01.

Table 4. Distribution of Vote by Party and Socio-demographic Categories

	ND	SYRIZA	OLIVE TREE	ANEL	GD	DIMAR	KKE	THE RIVER	OTHER
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
SEX									
Male	21.5	26.3	8.4	3.1	12.2	1.0	6.6	5.2	10.6
Female	23.9	28.2	7.6	3.9	5.7	1.5	5.7	8.4	9.7
AGE									
18-24	14.7	25.2	5.3	5.4	10.8	0.7	6.6	8.7	16.6
25-34	16.2	26.4	4.4	4.1	10.7	1.2	5.9	11.4	13.6
35-44	19.9	26.2	5.1	3.3	13.7	1.1	4.2	7.9	13.0
45-54	18.6	31.8	7.5	4.2	8.2	1.8	6.5	6.3	9.8
55-64	21.8	30.7	9.7	2.9	7.8	1.6	8.0	4.7	7.8
65+	39.0	21.3	14.4	1.8	5.9	0.7	6.3	2.5	4.1
EDUCATION									
Up to primary	32.6	25.1	13.4	1.8	7.8	0.6	7.5	2.2	5.8
Secondary (lower-upper-post secondary)	20.4	27.7	6.9	4.0	11.9	0.9	6.1	5.7	11.2
Tertiary (inc. master degree and PhD)	20.2	27.6	6.8	3.7	6.6	1.8	5.7	10.3	11.2
OCCUPATION									
Primary sector	27.7	18.7	9.5	1.4	13.8	1.4	7.7	3.3	13.4
Self-employed	19.8	29.6	8.2	3.1	12.2	0.9	5.9	6.3	7.6
Employed Public sector	17.3	30.9	7.3	3.5	9.2	1.7	4.0	7.0	14.3
Employed Private sector	16.8	28.8	4.9	3.6	10.1	1.4	6.4	10.3	12.4
Unemployed	16.1	30.0	5.4	4.8	12.0	0.5	6.4	7.0	12.5
Student	14.8	28.0	3.9	4.2	8.0	1.0	8.4	8.4	16.0
Homemakers	31.4	25.2	9.5	4.8	4.4	1.0	4.5	6.3	6.1
Retired	33.8	23.8	13.2	2.7	6.3	1.3	6.6	3.5	5.0

Source: Authors' own elaboration based on the *Joint Opinion, MRB, Alco, Metron Analysis 2014 European election exit poll*, N=6,730

Figure 1. Probability of Switching from Government Party (Previous FOE) to Opposition Party (2014 European Election) by Left-Right Placement FOE-SOE Distance and by EU Unification Placement FOE-SOE Distance




Source: Authors' own elaboration based on the Hellenic Panel Study: European Election Study 2014, weighted data

Note: Dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

(s): statistically significant; (ns): no statistical significance

Figure 2. Proportional Change in the Probability of Voting for each Party by an Increase of a Standard Deviation in Predictor Variables (Multinomial Logit Model)



Source: Authors' own elaboration based on the Hellenic Panel Study: European Election Study 2014, weighted data, N=867

ONLINE APPENDIX


Table A1. Multinomial Logistic Regression 2014 EP Elections (SYRIZA as Reference Category, N= 311)

	NEW DEMOCRACY		OLIVE TREE		GOLDEN DAWN		THE RIVER		KKE	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Sex (female)	.15	.43	.24	.48	-.82	.50	-.07	.28	-.53	.39
Age										
18-25	.14	.94	-2.51 ***	.91	-3.12 ***	1.11	-1.02	.90	-3.79 *	1.62
26-40	.17	.78	-2.08 ***	.72	-.23	.71	-1.14 *	.61	-.94	.67
41-64	.93	.73	-1.06	.65	.43	.65	-1.14 **	.54	-1.33 *	.68
65+	3.74 ***	1.19	2.91 ***	1.12	.92	1.29	1.08	1.08	4.6 ***	1.34
Education	.09	.41	.68	.43	.74 *	.39	-.40	.42	-.23	.35
Rural residence	.34	.44	.63	.49	-.39	.62	-.29	.37	.30	.41
Unemployed	1.01 *	.57	.93	.78	1.14 *	.64	-.35	.42	.52	.45
Retired	.75	.73	-.31	.68	1.83 **	.83	.05	.55	-3.32 **	1.48
Public sector employee	-.83	.53	.36	.49	-.81	.63	-.15	.35	.99 **	.41
Party identification	.67	.44	-.006 *	.41	-.18	.45	-.58 **	.27	.11	.38
Ideology (0-10 L-R scale)	1.87 ***	.24	.60 ***	.19	1.93 ***	.35	.77 ***	.13	-.35 ***	.11
Satisfaction with democracy (GR)	.74 **	.32	.79 ***	.30	-1.01 **	.42	.64 ***	.21	-.175	.34
Govt responsible for the crisis	-1.60 ***	.28	-1.88 ***	.33	-.56	.41	-.36 **	.21	-.97 ***	.34
EU responsible for the crisis	-.07	.23	.19	.21	.27	.25	-.11	.13	.11	.27
Further EU unification	.20 **	.08	.29 **	.13	-.15 *	.08	-.15 ***	.05	-.23 ***	.06
Worse personal econ. situation (retrosp.)	-.29	.24	-.51 **	.24	-.02	.25	-.42 ***	.16	-.20	.19
Intercept	-5.9 **	2.3	.85 **	.13	-8.8 **	4.13	.31	1.78	6.26 ***	2.22
N	207		91		87		133		38	
McFadden Pseudo- R ²	.490									

Source: Hellenic Panel Study: European Election Study 2014, weighted data

*Sig≤0.10; **Sig≤0.05 and ***Sig≤0.01


Figure A1. Evolution of Participation in National (N) and European (E) elections in Greece, 1981-2014



Source: Authors' own elaboration based on data by the Hellenic Ministry of Interior (www.ypes.gr)

Note: The EP elections of 1981 and those of 1989 were held at the same day with the national elections of October 1981 and June 1989a accordingly

Figure A2. Reasons for Abstaining from the 2014 EP Election (% of Non-voters that Selected Specific Item as One of their Three Possible Answers)



Source: Authors' own elaboration based on the Hellenic Panel Study: European Election Study 2014, weighted data, N=195