

The Gendered Selection into Temporary Employment across European Countries: Does the Male Breadwinner Norm Matter?

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Outline

Introduction

Theory and Hypotheses

- Gendered Selection (H1.a) and Flexibility as Explanation (H1.b)
- Actual (H2) and Anticipated (H3) Need for Flexibility
- Male Breadwinner Norm as Moderator (H4)

Data and Methods

- Choice of Data
- Operationalization
- Methods and Descriptives

Results

- H1.a: Gendered Selection and H1.b: Flexibility
- H2: Actual and H3: Anticipated Need for Flexibility
- H4: The Moderating Effect of the Male Breadwinner Norm

Conclusion

Appendix

Motivation

★ *Temporary employment* aka *fixed-term employment* = working contracts with a **predetermined expiry date**, e.g. project work or temporary agency jobs

- ▶ Great variation in the *distribution of fixed-term employment*
- ▶ However, *same arguments* on both the selection into and the consequences of temporary employment
- ▶ **Gender** as an important selection factor: Women are said to select more often into it compared to men due to *flexibility*
- ▶ Even though these arguments are used across countries, there are only a **few country-comparative studies**

Previous Research I

- *"Voluntary sorting [into fixed-term employment] is more likely to occur for women than for men"* (Booth et al., 2002, p. F193)
- *Flexibility* as characteristic of temporary agency jobs in the US → more attractive to women with children (Morris and Vekker, 2001)
- Proportion of women, who combine jobs and child caring responsibilities, is greater in temporary jobs in Australia (Wooden and Warren, 2016)

Previous Research II

- Even though there is empirical evidence for **negative effects of temporary jobs on the family life** (Scherer, 2009), more recent papers still rely on the assumption of *flexibility*:
- "*The flexible nature [of temporary jobs] offers opportunities for younger workers and women*" (Mooi-Reci and Wooden, 2017, p. 1087) – similar argumentation in Rigotti et al. (2015) or Macassa et al. (2017)

→ These are mostly only *arguments* to control for gender or adding interaction terms but the question of the **actual gendered selection procedure** remains **unanswered**.

Research Question

- **Aim:** Testing the selection argumentation of *flexibility* across European countries and digging deeper into the selection mechanism and the gender-based preferences across countries

→ **Research question:**

Do women rather than men prefer fixed-term employment because of its flexibility and does it vary by social norms?

The Gendered Selection

- Assumption of women compared to men *voluntarily* selecting into temporary employment because of the expected career interruptions due to family responsibilities
- Result of the necessity to combine both work and family life rather than men (role theory)
- Rational for employers to choose women for jobs with predetermined durations to avoid high costs:

H1.a: *On average, women should hold a temporary rather than a permanent working contract more often than men.*

The Flexibility Argument

- *Voluntary* selection of women into fixed-term employment is rooted in greater degree of flexibility
- Temporary contracts require less commitment to employer compared to permanent jobs → might increase perceived flexibility (better work-life balance):

H1.b: *On average, fixed-term jobs should be more likely to offer flexibility compared to permanent jobs.*

Why Should Women Need Flexibility? (I): Actual Need

- Different importance of *flexibility* within job when having young children for both partners
- Caring responsibilities of women (→ specialization on caring tasks) rather than men (→ focus on labor market):

H2: *The gendered selection into fixed-term employment should be stronger when there is a toddler within the household.*

Why Should Women Need Flexibility? (II): Anticipated Need

- **Anticipating** the need to care for children as important for job choice → gendered distribution of responsibilities
- Anticipation of having a children biologically rather possible for younger individuals than for older ones:

H3: The gendered selection into fixed-term employment should be stronger in childbearable age.

Macro-Level Indicators for Explanation

- Expectation of rather women to balance work and family life is rooted in **social norms** within countries
- **Male breadwinner norm**: men as mainly responsible for providing financial resources → (*male breadwinner*), women specialize on home production → (*female homemaker*)
- More equally spreaded tasks within countries with **egalitarian norms** → less variance in preferences for jobs:

H4: *The more pronounced the male breadwinner norm, the stronger the gendered selection into fixed-term employment.*

Labor Force Survey - Ad Hoc Module 2010

- ★ **EU-LFS 2010** microdata for **30 countries** provides all relevant variables (analyses: $N(\min) = 21$, $N(\max) = 26$)
 - ★ Enables **country-comparative view**
 - ★ Ad-hoc module includes comprehensive information on both **work-life-balance** + **labor market status**
- **Sample restriction:** No unemployed individuals,
no self-employees,
no individuals in education,
no retirees
and only people ≥ 20 and ≤ 65 years

Measurement for the Key Variables

Concept

Measurement

Micro level

Type of contract

Temporary vs. permanent employment

Gender

Female vs. male employee

Flexibility

Possible flexibly arrange wrk. hrs vs. not

Toddler

Children \leq 4 years in HH vs. not

Childbearable age

\leq 40 vs. $>$ 40

Macro level

Male-breadwinner norm

Gender Inequality Index (UNDP)

Measurement for the Control Variables

Concept

Measurement

Micro level

Education ISCED-97, 3 levels (l/u secondary, tertiary)

Marital status Married vs. unmarried

Firm size > 10 employees vs. ≤ 10

Age 5-year intervals

Sector ISCO-88 classification as proxy

Urbanity Urban, mediocre and rural area

Migrant Nationality: native vs. not

Macro level

GDP GDP per capita in US\$ (OECD)

EPL EPL on temporary employment (OECD)

Maternity leave Months of paid maternity leave (OECD)

Methods

Binary logistic multilevel models → modelling two-level structure for the effects of individuals being nested in countries

Two-step estimation procedure:

$$[1] \text{ fixed}_{ij} = \beta_1 \cdot \text{gender}_{ij} + \beta_2 \cdot \text{education}_{ij} + \dots + \beta_7 \cdot \text{urbanity}_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}$$

$$[2] \beta_1 = \mu_1 \cdot \text{GII}_j + \mu_2 \cdot \text{GDP}_j + \mu_3 \cdot \text{EPL}_j + \mu_4 \cdot \text{maternityleave}_j + \lambda_j$$

→ **most flexible specification** on first step [1]

→ OLS on the second step [2] **more robust** to small N

Descriptives

Variable (Micro)	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Fixed-term employment	.10			
Flexibility	.33			
Female	.49			
Toddler	.32			
Childbearable age	.48			
Age	40.39	9.48	22	62
Education Ref.: lower secondary				
upper secondary	.48			
third level	.32			
Urbanity Ref.: thinly populated				
intermediate area	.24			
densely populated	.34			
Married	.70			
Migrant	.06			
Larger firm	.76			

$N = 26$, $n = 181$, 139, Own calculations using the LFS 2010

Descriptives

Variable (Macro)	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
GII	.13	.05	.05	.26
GDP	35082.38	14343.0	17560.8	85514.9
EPL	1.76	.91	.38	3.75
Maternity leave	56.67	44.67	14	164


N = 26, Own calculations using the LFS 2010

List of countries: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Czech Republic (CZ), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Croatia (HR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Iceland (IS), Italy (IT), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Latvia (LV), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Sweden (SE), Slovenia (SI), Slovak Republic (SK), United Kingdom (UK)

H1.a: The Gendered Selection

→ H1.a: *On average, women should hold a temporary rather than a permanent working contract more often than men.* ✓


Gendered selection into fixed-term employment: AMEs



H1.b: The Flexibility Argument

→ H1.b: *On average, fixed-term jobs should be more likely to offer flexibility compared to permanent jobs.* ✗


Flexibility of fixed-term jobs vs. permanent ones: AMEs



H2: Actual Need for Flexibility

→ H2: *The gendered selection into fixed-term employment should be stronger when there is a toddler within the household.* ✗

The gendered selection with a toddler




$N = 21$, AMEs displayed, own calculations using the EU-LFS 2010

Green dots indicate statistically significant results for $p < 0.05$, orange for $p < 0.1$ and grey for insignificant results

H3: Anticipated Need for Flexibility

→ H3: *The gendered selection should be stronger in childbearable age.* ✓



$N = 26$, AMEs displayed, own calculations using the EU-LFS 2010

Green dots indicate statistically significant results for $p < 0.05$, orange for $p < 0.1$ and grey for insignificant results

H4: Cross-Level Interaction with Male Breadwinner Norm

→ H4: *The more pronounced the male breadwinner norm, the stronger the gendered selection into fixed-term employment.* ✗


Dependent variable: β_1

Male Breadwinner	-18.41*
	(-1.84)
EPL	1.101**
	(2.26)
GDP	-0.0000457
	(-1.26)
Maternity leave	0.0157
	(1.59)
<hr/>	
N	26
R^2	0.282

t statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Own calculations using the EU-LFS 2010

H4: Cross-Level Interaction with Male Breadwinner Norm

→ H4: *The more pronounced the male breadwinner norm, the stronger the gendered selection into fixed-term employment.* ✗



$N = 26$, own calculations using the EU-LFS 2010

Conclusions

- Female employees more often fixed-term employed than men in most European countries
- However, **very mixed results** in strength and significance
- Also holds for H1.b, H2 and 3: results more than mixed between the countries, age as important interaction effect
- *Norms seem to matter* - but different than expected: Traditional gender norms increase the likelihood of women being permanently employed

- (1) need to specify multilevel models **more flexible** and
- (2) the selection seems not to be driven by *flexibility*

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Discussion

- Sample definition: only individuals **active on the labor market** → perhaps *selective group*
- Discussion of whether the GII is a *good proxy* for male breadwinner norm
- Unclear what *flexibility* actually refers to
- Not possible to **analyze selection itself** with the data and methods on hand
- At cost of flexibility for the two-step estimation procedure, **different weights for different estimates**, as n of observations vary (see Descriptives in Appendix)
- **Panel data** would enable to dig deeper into selection of women in a causal way

Descriptives

Univariate Descriptives for Key (In)Dependent Variables

Country	Fixed-term	Flexibility	Gender	Child	Age	N
AT	.04	.39	.48	.46	.44	13,750
BE	.06	.21	.48	.52	.45	8,564
CZ	.08	.27	.47	.47	.44	15,027
DE	.08	.41	.49	.42	.35	13,701
DK	.05	.43	.53	N.A.	.29	9,692
EE	.03	.23	.52	.48	.38	3,565
ES	.21	.12	.48	.49	.43	29,447
FI	.10	.55	.51	N.A.	.37	9,660
FR	.13	.34	.52	.50	.45	13,027
GR	.13	.27	.43	.49	.49	17,332
HR	.12	.07	.46	.35	.41	2,637
HU	.11	.06	.49	.39	.44	20,993

Own calculations using the EU-LFS 2010

Descriptives

Univariate Descriptives for Key (In)Dependent Variables

Country	Fixed-term	Flexibility	Gender	Child	Age	N
IE	.06	.35	.54	.59	.50	17,701
IS	.09	.45	.48	N.A.	.39	1,483
IT	.12	.35	.45	.46	.39	41,216
LT	.02	.12	.56	.43	.35	5,552
LU	.04	.26	.48	.49	.43	6,506
LV	.07	.04	.56	.52	.38	2,821
NL	.10	.26	.49	.47	.37	20,976
NO	.06	.53	.49	N.A.	.40	10,876
PL	.26	.11	.47	.51	.48	26,765
PT	.21	.10	.50	.40	.42	12,246

Own calculations using the EU-LFS 2010

Descriptives

Univariate Descriptives for Key (In)Dependent Variables

Country	Fixed-term	Flexibility	Gender	Child	Age	N
SE	.10	.44	.51	N.A.	.39	24,110
SI	.12	.13	.49	.49	.39	5,319
SK	.05	.09	.48	.39	.43	8,270
UK	.04	.38	.51	.51	.42	29,599

Own calculations using the EU-LFS 2010

Model Fit

Table on Model Fits

Model fit	AT	BE	CZ	DE	DK	EE
H1.a C-U R^2	0.0720	0.119	0.0694	0.103	0.0737	0.106
<i>AIC</i>	4566.0	3680.1	7690.7	7184.1	3776.8	990.9
<i>BIC</i>	4701.5	3799.9	7827.8	7312.0	3906.0	1095.9
H1.b C-U R^2	0.189	0.113	0.117	0.162	0.262	0.0545
<i>AIC</i>	16335.5	7764.6	16201.5	16336.7	11294.6	3749.9
<i>BIC</i>	16425.8	7848.7	16292.8	16419.1	11380.9	3824.0
H2 C-U R^2	0.0491	0.0930	0.115	0.0843	N.A.	0.123
<i>AIC</i>	1504.7	1319.6	2159.6	1926.3	N.A.	358.5
<i>BIC</i>	1634.7	1435.7	2289.0	2045.6	N.A.	448.2
H3 C-U R^2	0.0732	0.119	0.0740	0.104	0.0741	0.108
<i>AIC</i>	4564.9	3681.6	7665.0	7185.4	3779.4	993.4
<i>BIC</i>	4715.5	3815.4	7817.4	7328.2	3922.9	1110.7

Own calculations using the EU-LFS 2010

Model Fit

Table on Model Fits

Model fit	ES	FI	FR	GR	HR	HU
H1.a C-U R^2	0.147	0.102	0.106	0.129	0.172	0.193
<i>AIC</i>	27085.2	5938.4	9200.7	12069.5	1714.2	12901.0
<i>BIC</i>	27234.5	6067.5	9335.3	12209.2	1820.0	13044.2
H1.b C-U R^2	0.0814	0.228	0.209	0.0371	0.0742	0.0716
<i>AIC</i>	20722.9	11324.5	14621.9	19136.4	1284.6	8917.2
<i>BIC</i>	20822.4	11410.4	14711.5	19229.2	1355.1	9012.4
H2 C-U R^2	0.139	N.A.	0.0816	0.168	0.154	0.239
<i>AIC</i>	10175.1	N.A.	3235.1	3946.4	614.9	4225.7
<i>BIC</i>	10321.6	N.A.	3364.4	4081.1	706.0	4361.6
H3 C-U R^2	0.148	0.103	0.106	0.131	0.182	0.198
<i>AIC</i>	27076.5	5939.7	9201.9	12054.5	1704.1	12852.8
<i>BIC</i>	27242.3	6083.2	9351.4	12209.7	1821.7	13011.9

Own calculations using the EU-LFS 2010

Model Fit

Table on Model Fits

Model fit	IE	IS	IT	LT	LU	LV
H1.a C-U R^2	0.0573	0.0732	0.141	0.231	0.0596	0.258
<i>AIC</i>	8144.0	863.7	27787.3	987.7	2393.1	1203.3
<i>BIC</i>	8268.3	948.6	27942.5	1100.2	2515.0	1304.3
H1.b C-U R^2	0.0525	0.168	0.0422	0.0585	0.125	0.0910
<i>AIC</i>	22549.0	1846.6	51865.8	3820.3	6948.9	970.9
<i>BIC</i>	22642.5	1904.8	51969.3	3899.7	7030.4	1036.2
H2 C-U R^2	0.0690	N.A.	0.123	0.205	0.0358	0.299
<i>AIC</i>	3297.8	N.A.	9838.4	351.2	992.6	433.5
<i>BIC</i>	3422.7	N.A.	9991.1	446.2	1104.9	519.8
H3 C-U R^2	0.0588	0.0742	0.143	0.231	0.0600	0.259
<i>AIC</i>	8137.9	867.1	27743.4	991.6	2396.3	1204.8
<i>BIC</i>	8277.8	962.5	27915.9	1117.5	2531.7	1317.7

Own calculations using the EU-LFS 2010

Model Fit

Table on Model Fits

Model fit	NL	NO	PL	PT	SE	SI
H1.a C-U R^2	0.102	0.137	0.158	0.169	0.142	0.138
<i>AIC</i>	12661.1	4162.6	27459.6	11215.4	14080.5	3489.5
<i>BIC</i>	12803.9	4293.9	27607.1	11348.9	14226.1	3607.8
H1.b C-U R^2	0.0827	0.200	0.0490	0.100	0.242	0.105
<i>AIC</i>	22319.3	13244.4	18227.9	7249.6	28224.0	3741.6
<i>BIC</i>	22414.6	13331.9	18326.3	7338.5	28321.0	3820.4
H2 C-U R^2	0.0707	N.A.	0.157	0.117	N.A.	0.141
<i>AIC</i>	4905.2	N.A.	11848.3	4414.7	N.A.	1217.1
<i>BIC</i>	5045.4	N.A.	11995.1	4543.9	N.A.	1327.8
H3 C-U R^2	0.103	0.138	0.161	0.172	0.143	0.140
<i>AIC</i>	12653.1	4163.2	27403.0	11195.1	14067.1	3489.3
<i>BIC</i>	12811.8	4309.1	27566.9	11343.3	14228.9	3620.8

Own calculations using the EU-LFS 2010

Model Fit

Table on Model Fits

Model fit	SK	UK
H1.a C-U R^2	0.252	0.0500
<i>AIC</i>	2805.2	9403.2
<i>BIC</i>	2924.4	9552.6
H1.b C-U R^2	0.155	0.0972
<i>AIC</i>	4566.8	37455.2
<i>BIC</i>	4644.0	37554.9
H2 C-U R^2	0.336	0.0552
<i>AIC</i>	868.6	3092.6
<i>BIC</i>	980.3	3238.0
H3 C-U R^2	0.255	0.0503
<i>AIC</i>	2800.7	9405.3
<i>BIC</i>	2934.0	9571.2

Own calculations using the EU-LFS 2010